This topically organized, interdisciplinary anthology provides competing perspective on the claim that western culture faces a moral crisis. Using clearly written, accessible essays by well-known authors in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities, the book introduces students to a variety of perspectives on the current cultural debate about values that percolates beneath the surface of most of our social and political controversies.

This book might be said to be the exploration, first, of the 'fateful' consequences, and subsequently -- by a poetic transference of situation -- of the ...

The representational theory of measurement has long been the central paradigm in the philosophy of measurement. Such is not the case anymore, partly under the influence of the critique according to which RTM offers too poor descriptions of the measurement procedures actually followed in science. This can be called the metrological critique of RTM. I claim that the critique is partly irrelevant. This is because, in general, RTM is not in the business of describing measurement procedures, be it in idealized (...) form. To support this claim, I present various cases where RTM can be said to investigate measurement without providing any measurement procedure. Such limit cases lead to a better understanding of the RTM project. They also illustrate some of the questions which the philosophy of measurement can explore, when it is ready to go beyond the metrological viewpoint. (shrink)

This article briefly presents some of the main features of the notion of “centrality of work” within the framework of the “psychodynamic” approach to work developed by Christophe Dejours. The paper argues that we should distinguish between at least four separate but related ways in which work can be said to be central: psychologically, in terms of gender relations, social-politically and epistemically.

One of America's foremost public intellectuals, Jean Bethke Elshtain has been on the frontlines in the most hotly contested and deeply divisive issues of our time. Now in Real Politics , Elshtain gives further proof of her willingness to speak her mind, courting disagreement and even censure from those who prefer their ideologies neat. At the center of Elshtain's work is a passionate concern with the relationship between political rhetoric and political action. For Elshtain, politics is a sphere of (...) concrete responsibility. Political speech should, therefore, approach the richness of actual lives and commitments rather than present impossible utopias. In her essays, Elshtain finds in the writings of Václav Havel, Hannah Arendt, and Albert Camus a language appropriate to the complexity of everyday life and politics, and she critiques philosophers and writers who distance us from a concrete, embodied world. She argues against those repressive strains within contemporary feminism which insist that families and even sexual differentiation are inherently oppressive. Along the way, she challenges an ideology of victimization that too often loses sight of individual victims in its pursuit of abstract goals. Elshtain reaffirms the quirky and by no means simple pleasures of small-town life as a microcosm of the human condition and considers the current crisis in American education and its consequences for democracy. Beyond exploring the details of political life over the past two decades, Real Politics advocates a via media politics that avoids unacceptable extremes and serves as a model for responsible political discourse. Throughout her diverse and insightful writings, Elshtain champions a civic philosophy that tends to the dignity of everyday life as a democratic imperative of the first order. "Jean Bethke Elshtain is a person of rare intellect. The moral wisdom that pervades these essays reminds us that when all is said and done politics is about the life and death of real people who are anything but abstractions. Her erudition is remarkable, but equally stunning is her eye for the significant. What she is so good at is helping us see the moral and political significance of the everyday."--Stanley Hauerwas, Duke University " Real Politics serves as a forceful reminder that Jean Elshtain has been dealing with the real world in twenty-five years of powerful essaying. Transcending ideological categories, she writes out of hope that human beings can enjoy those capacities of reason and faith which make them human. It is a pleasure to be reintroduced to her sustained intelligence."--Alan Wolfe, Boston University. (shrink)

The possible and revelation -- The saturated phenomenon -- Metaphysics and phenomenology: a relief for theology -- "Christian philosophy": hermeneutic or heuristic? -- Sketch of a phenomenological concept of the gift -- What cannot be said: Apophasis and the discourse of love -- The banality of saturation -- Faith and reason.

“He devoured her with his eyes.” This expression and many other signs point to the illusion common to both realism and idealism: to know is to eat. After a hundred years of academicism, French philosophy remains at that point. We have all read Brunschvicg, Lalande, and Meyerson,2 we have all believed that the spidery mind trapped things in its web, covered them with a white spit and slowly swallowed them, reducing them to its own substance. What is a table, a (...) rock, a house? Answer: a certain assemblage of “contents of consciousness,” a class of such contents. Oh digestive philosophy! Yet nothing seemed more obvious: is not the table the actual content of my perception? Is not my perception the present state of my consciousness? Nutrition, assimilation! Assimilation, Lalande said, of things to ideas, of ideas by ideas, of minds by minds. The corpulent skeletons of the world were picked clean by these diligent diastases: assimilation, unification, identification. The simplest and plainest among us vainly looked for something solid, something not just mental, but would encounter everywhere only a soft and very genteel mist: themselves. (shrink)

Sacrificing one's own interests in order to serve another is, in general, supposed to be a good thing, an example of altruism, the hallmark of morality, and something we should commend to (but not always require of) the entirely-too-selfish human beings of our society. But let me recount a story that I hope will persuade the reader to start questioning this conventional philosophical wisdom. Last year, a friend of mine was talking with me about a mutual acquaintance whose two sons (...) were in the same nursery school as our sons. This woman, whom I will call Terry, had been pregnant with twins, but one of the twins had died during the fourth month of pregnancy, and the other twin had just been born prematurely at six months with a host of medical problems. We were discussing how stressful this woman's life had been while she was pregnant: she was a housewife, and her two boys, aged three and five, were lively, challenging, often unruly--a real handful to raise. Her husband worked long hours in a law firm, so the vast majority of the childcare and household chores fell on her shoulders. "You could see that she was exhausted by end of the first trimester," I maintained, "because her eyes were tired, and her cheeks were sunken--she looked almost like a cadaver." My friend agreed. I went on to blame her exhaustion on the fact that she had to do too much during a pregnancy that anyone would have found difficuIt. "I don't understand her husband," I maintained. "Surely he could how badly she looked. If he had concern for his future children, why didn't he do something to help her so that the pregnancy had a chance of going better? And if he loved her, why didn't he cut down his hours so that he could help out at home? Surely he could see just by looking at her that she was in trouble," My friend said nothing at the time, but after a week she called me, and told me that my criticism of this woman's husband had bothered her all week. "You're wrong about Terry's husband not caring enough about her, They have a good marriage," she insisted, and then she continued: "You know, you're not like us, We accept the fact that we should do most of the childcare and housework.. (shrink)

he article focuses on the contemporary social movements and new identities as well as the new theoretical paradigms to explain these developments. It is reported that the social movements like feminist, ecological, and local-autonomy movements started in the Europe in the 1970's. The participants in these movements, it is said, did not view themselves in terms of a socioeconomic class. Class background does not determine the collective identities of the actors of these socio-political movements. Different social philosophers and thinkers (...) like Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim and their ideas are also discussed. (shrink)

Our aim is to analyze the position of the leader in relation to the ethical dimension of truth-telling within the organization under his/her control. Based on Michel Foucault’s study of truth-telling, we demonstrate that the role of the leader toward the corporation and the imperative of organizational performance place the leader in an ambiguous position: he/she is obliged to take the lead in “telling the truth” internally and externally, but also to bear the consequences of this “truth-telling” for the organization (...) and for himself/herself. In this process of construction and implementing the truth, the leader is organizer and figurehead of the corporation’s truth-telling practices: determining the frontiers between truth that can be said and that which should remain hidden, both inside and outside the corporation; establishing a dialogue based on truth ; guaranteeing that the rules of truth-telling are respected; and offering a truth which is compatible with the firm’s economic and ethical interest. Invested with the authority—the office—of managing truth within the corporation, the leader can be considered to be the “Chief Truth Officer.” From this perspective, we demonstrate that this role requires specific skills, like courage and practical wisdom. (shrink)

As the title of this paper suggests, these remarks on Foucault should be understood as an attempt to complete the picture that McDonell has provided of Michel Foucault's work, rather than as a critique of that picture. I find myself in agreement with much that McDonell has said, but would nevertheless like to comment on a few points. There are two main features of McDonell's introduction to Foucault. First, the overall bearing of Foucault's work is held to have to (...) do with the history of ideas, with a special concern with the methodology that such a type of history should follow. Second, the work of Michel Foucault possesses a rather strong unity that can be stressed in taking L'archéologie du savoir as, so to speak, the sun of a small theoretical system around which revolve such planets of written words as Histoire de Ia folie à l'âge classique, Naissance de Ia clinique, Les mots et les chases and, eventually, Surveiller et punir. (shrink)

Axel Honneth’s philosophical reflections always had significant historical dimensions, but it is only recently, in Recognition. A Chapter in the History of European Ideas, that he has attended to the history of recognition as a concept. This essay examines the cogency and the implications of this turn to intellectual history in the theory of recognition. The first section summarises the main historical claims put forward by Honneth. Section two raises critical doubts regarding three aspects of his narrative: the cultural contexts (...) that are said to have influenced particular conceptions of recognition; the conceptions of recognition that are supposed to be tied to national cultures; and the method of linking particular meanings of recognition to national cultures. The third section broadens the scope and attempts to show why this turn to intellectual history, despite some shortcomings, raises tantalising questions for recognition theory, and beyond it, for critical theory. (shrink)

On the one hand, freedom is said to be the property of a subject. On the other, freedom only happens in the space of being-in-common. Freedom, then, is the place of a conflict between the “self” and the “with,” between independence or autonomy and dependence or sharing. Resolving this apparent antinomy requires showing how the with ontologically constitutes the self. This, in turn, allows for a rethinking of freedom beyond what liberal democracy and political economy have to offer, as (...) the renewed opening of existence onto nothing, or onto an “outside” that the opening itself constitutes. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the varieties of love in Toni Morrison’s novels. Love in a Morrison novel is always embedded in history, each character’s way of loving inflected by legacies from the ancestral past as well as from his or her personal past. Morrison has said that her novels are didactic. They teach a reader to think anew about love, race and gender. I differentiate in this essay between the early novels, which teach through character and plot and an (...) occasional direct authorial statement, and the later novels, starting with Beloved, which challenge a reader’s preconceptions about love through more subtle structural means. For example, deferred disclosures or gaps in meaning in the later novels draw out a reader’s assumptions about love and then, through a narrative twist, prompt the reader to examine and re-evaluate them. Love comes in a different shape in each later novel, surprising conventional expectations – from love as the deep friendship between young girls in Love to Home’s conception of love as a disruptive force that produces profound change in the lover to the characterization of love in Jazz as something you innovate and recreate each moment. The subtle formal techniques that engage a reader’s own values in an ethical dialogue with the text constitute Morrison’s variation on the tradition of call-and-response central to African American art forms. An overview of love in the first four novels is followed by a close reading of three later novels: Beloved, Home and Jazz. (shrink)

The concept of the Transitional Economy denotes the problematic processes of change confronting nations wishing to achieve levels of economic development comparable with that of Western nations. Such an objective is problematic, as these nations may also be said to be in a state of transition. Globalization and E-commerce have necessitated a reconsideration of the nature of business activity and its implications for both society and the individual.Writers such as Gray (1998) warn against the "refashioning" of other nations in (...) the image of the American free market. Business ethics can be seen as a symbolic expression of Beck''s (1992) concern with the implications of Risk Society and the uncertainties arising from the realization that scientific, technological, and economic progress are not necessarily concomitant with social, cultural, and political progress. Locating business ethics within the theoretical context of Reflexive Modernity provides a means of evaluating the contribution that it can make to providing a critical forum for considering the ways in which business organisations are responding to concerns regarding business activity. (168). (shrink)

When the meta-philosophies of Nominalism and Realism are compared, it is often said that Nominalism is motivated by a methodology of ontological economy, while Realism would be motivated by an appeal to Common Sense. In this paper, I argue that this association is misguided. After briefly comparing the meta-philosophy of Common Sense and the meta-philosophy of economy, I show that the core motivation in favour of Realism relies in fact in a principle of economy which violates the methodology of (...) Common Sense. I conclude that Common Sense philosophers should endorse Nominalism. (shrink)

This work is a collective reflection on the modern self as a narrative. Modernity as a metamorphic conglomeration of permeating discourses, new practices and institutional forms, a historical unfolding of centrifugal and centripetal discursive dynamics of regulation and normalization offers limitless grounds for a critical investigation. The modern self, both as the revelation of the inner self and as a reflection of the collective, arises from the dialogical interplay within the intersubjective communicative space of social discourse. The bestiary proposed in (...) this series of articles attempts to rethink the spectacle consisting of modern dichotomies by which the self is declined along ontological, metaphysical, and ethical premises: the real and the ideal, the said and the unsaid, the rational and the irrational, the bound and the free, the familiar and the exotic, the universal and the particular, self and world. The reader is therefore encouraged to engage in a multiple reading of the articles presented in this collection. As individual scholarly pieces of inquiry, these articles provide thoughtful insights into the inexhaustible topic of modernity and the modern subject-they tell stories of the past, the present, and of a prospective future. As academic works, however, they also reflect and/or unsettle disciplinary paradigms and scholarly practices, from which they acquire legitimacy and visibility; they conform, apply, reconfigure and/or experiment with new grounds by borrowing from an eclectic mix of various thinkers, their tools, and their axiomatic propositions that constitute their theoretical and critical apparatus. This exercise is ultimately an introspective journey in which we are placed not only as the spectator-the one who gazes through the bars-but also the spectacle-the beast subject to the gaze-finding itself in a predicament of which the subject, itself, is the architect. (shrink)

A Controlled Not variant of the standard quantum teleportation protocol affords a step-by-step analysis of what is, or can be said to be, achieved in the process in either location. Dominant interpretations of what quantum teleportation consists in and implies are reviewed in this light. Being mindful of the statistical significance of the terms and operations involved, as well as awareness of classical analogies, can help sort out what is specifically quantum-mechanical, and what is not, in so-called teleportation. What (...) the latter achieves appears to be the transmission, without the involvement of mysterious channels, of what a quantum state encapsulates: the multitiered probabilistic characterization of a given preparation, which might be all we can possibly know about a physical system in a given experimental situation. (shrink)

Although much has been said about the decline of the printed word, this would be hard to claim for the discipline of philosophy. Recent years have seen a proliferation of dictionaries, anthologies, "companions," and histories. Though varying in format, they are all intended to give readers—scholars, students, and philosophically-inclined members of the public—both a general overview of certain periods and fields, and a sophisticated, up-to-date discussion of standard topics and problems. While this might all seem too much of a (...) good thing, especially since many of the same authors are included in the different collections published by different presses, taken as a whole the enterprise will no doubt serve to elevate .. (shrink)

This paper aims to shed new light on Hegel’s rather problematic statements about Asian thinking and Chinese philosophy by disclosing the Orientalist antecedents found in Kant’s anthropological works. First, the notion of Orientalism will be defined with reference to Orientalism and “Orientalism Reconsidered” by Edward Said. Second, an exploration of Kant’s anthropological research will show that this constituted the turning point in the Western Orientalist perception of China which had a strong influence on Hegel Finally, it will be claimed (...) that Hegel’s Orientalist perception of China rests on a definition of culture as the expression of the “spirit of a people” that has recently been revised by contemporary post-colonial anthropologists. (shrink)

Selon l’interprétation traditionnelle, la révolution copernicienne, qui opère le passage du géocentrisme à l’héliocentrisme, aurait détrôné et dévalorisé l’homme, en lui retirant sa position cen­trale, et donc privilégiée, dans le cosmos, pour le reléguer sur une planète devenue analogue aux autres et occupant une place quelconque à l’intérieur du système solaire. Cette inter­prétation ne pèche pas seulement dans sa compréhension de l’héliocentrisme copernicien, mais également dans sa percep­tion du géocentrisme aristotélico-médiéval. Il faut donc dénon­cer sa fausseté générale et, plus encore, (...) lui substituer un autre schéma interprétatif qui, peut-être moins évocateur de notre rapport au monde, soit plus respectueux de la vérité historique. ––– According to the traditional interpretation, the Copernican revo­lution, which brought about the transfer from geocentrism to heliocentrism, is said to have dethroned and devalued man by removing his central and hence privileged position in the cos­mos and by relegating him to a planet now seen as analogous to others occupying an insignificant position within the solar system. This interpretation fails not only in its understanding of Copernican heliocentrism, but also in its percep­tion of Aristo­telian mediaeval geocentrism. It is necessary, therefore, not only to denounce its general falsity, but also to substitute for it a different interpretative scheme which, although it may empha­size less our link with the world, may be more respectful of historical truth. (shrink)

_Critical Essays _ contains essays on literature and philosophy from a highly formative period of French philosopher and leading existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre’s life, the years between 1938 and 1946. This period is particularly interesting because it is before Sartre published the magnum opus that would solidify his name as a philosopher, _Being and Nothingness_. Instead, during this time Sartre was emerging as one of France’s most promising young novelists and playwrights—he had already published _Nausea, The Age of Reason, The (...) Flies, _and_ No Exit_. Not content, however, he was meanwhile consciously attempting to revive the form of the essay via detailed examinations of writers who were to become central to European cultural life in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Collected here are Sartre’s experiments in reimagining the idea and structure of the essay. Among the distinguished writers he analyzes are Francis Ponge, Georges Bataille, Vladimir Nabokov, Maurice Blanchot, and, of course, Albert Camus, whose novel _The Stranger _Sartre endeavours to explain in these pages. _Critical Essays _ also contains a famous attack on the Catholic novelist François Mauriac, studies of the great American literary iconoclasts Faulkner and Dos Passos, and brief but insightful essays on aspects of the philosophical writings of Husserl and Descartes. This new translation by Chris Turner reinvigorates the original skill and voice of Sartre’s work and will be essential reading for fans of Sartre and the many writers and works he explores. “For my generation he has always been one of the great intellectual heroes of the twentieth century, a man whose insight and intellectual gifts were at the service of nearly every progressive cause of our time.”—Edward Said. (shrink)

A great deal of thought has been given to the effects of information technology on reading, books and printed material. Its impact on writing, the production of texts, which is, however, the counterpart of reading, has not aroused the same interest. It is true that witnesses to the act of creation are less familiar objects than books or newspapers: in spite of the passion of the media and the educated public for writers’ manuscripts, these remain predominantly the prerogative of researchers (...) and are still rarely taken out of libraries and archive collections. In extremely literate Western societies, reading is an activity practised by large sectors of the population. The same cannot be said about writing as an active producer of texts, for this encompasses a much more limited group of professionals, and is thought, more or less, to require a special gift in its literary form. Written production is rather the hidden face of McLuhan's Gutenberg galaxy, and the commercial businesses which manufacture and distribute writing in its printed form are better known to the public than the mysterious secrets of creation. (shrink)

The history of money is several thousand years old., since, it is said, the Chinese first put coins into circulation in about 1100 B.C.

The book proposes a critique of Nietzsche's works 'from within'. In doing so, it answers the continuing question asked by any reader of Nietzsche: Why did he decide not to write the major work he said he would write?

Ludics [1] is a novel approach to logic—especially proof-theory. The present introduction emphasises foundational issues.For ages, not a single disturbing idea in the area of “foundations”: the discussion is sort of ossified—as if everything had been said, as if all notions had taken their definite place, in a big cemetery of ideas. One can still refresh the flowers or regild the stone, e.g., prove technicalities, sometimes non-trivial; but the real debate is still: this paper begins with an autopsy, the (...) autopsy of the foundational project.Up to say 1900, the realist/dualist approach to science was dominant; during the last century some domains like physics evolved so as to become completely anti-realist; but this evolution hardly concerned logic.By the turn of the XXth century mathematics was jeopardised by paradoxes, the most famous of them being due to Russell. Hilbert's reaction was to focus on consistency. But the reduction of paradoxes—and therefore of foundations—to solely the antinomies is highly questionable: indeed, the typical paradoxical artifacts are secret sharers, objects satisfying the formal definitions but far astray from the intended meaning, typically the Peano “curve” which contradicts our perception of dimension. Fortunately, topology has been able to show that dimension m is not the same as dimension n … but just for a second, forget this and imagine consistent mathematics in which balls in any dimension are homeomorphic: what a disaster! This exclusive focus on consistency—not to speak of the strategic failure of the Programme—should explain why logic, especially foundations lost contact with other sciences during last century. (shrink)

Winston Churchill said of democracy that it was ‘the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.’ The same could be said of liberalism. While liberalism displays an unfailing optimism with regard to the capacity of human beings to make themselves ‘masters and possessors of nature’, it displays a profound pessimism when it comes to appreciating their moral capacity to build a decent world for themselves. As Michea shows, (...) the roots of this pessimism lie in the idea – an eminently modern one – that the desire to establish the reign of the Good lies at the origin of all the ills besetting the human race. Liberalism’s critique of the ‘tyranny of the Good’ naturally had its costs. It created a view of modern politics as a purely negative art – that of defining the least bad society possible. It is in this sense that liberalism has to be understood, and understands itself, as the ‘politics of lesser evil’. By unravelling the logic that lies at the heart of the liberal project, Michea is able to shed fresh light on one of the key ideas that have shaped the civilization of the West. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky applies a rational, scientific approach to disciplines as diverse as linguistics, ethics, and politics. His best-known innovations involve a groundbreaking theory of generative grammar, the revolution it initiated in cognitive science, and a radical encounter with political theory and practice. In _Chomsky Notebook_, Cedric Boeckx and Norbert Hornstein tackle the evolution of Chomsky's linguistic theory. Akeel Bilgrami revisits Chomsky's work on freedom and truth, and Pierre Jacob analyzes his naturalism. Chomsky's own contributions include an interview with Jean (...) Bricmont and an essay each on Edward Said and the natural world. Altogether, these works reveal the penetrating insight of a remarkable intellectual whose thought extends into a number of fields within and outside of academia. For the uninitiated reader and longtime fan, this anthology attests to the power of Chomsky's rationalism and the dexterity of his critical investigations. (shrink)

Why is it that the modern conception of literature begins with one of the worst writers of the philosophical tradition? Such is the paradoxical question that lies at the heart of Jean-Luc Nancy’s highly original and now-classic study of the role of language in the critical philosophy of Kant. While Kant did not turn his attention very often to the philosophy of language, Nancy demonstrates to what extent he was anything but oblivious to it. He shows, in fact, that (...) the question of philosophical style, of how to write critical philosophy, goes to the core of Kant’s attempt to articulate the limits, once and for all, that would establish human reason in its autonomy and freedom. He also shows how this properly philosophical program, the very pinnacle of the Enlightenment, leads Kant to posit literature as its other by way of what is here called the syncope, and how this other of philosophy, entirely its product, cannot be said to exist outside of metaphysics in its accomplishment. This subtle, unprecedented reading of Kant demonstrates the continued importance of reflection on the relation between philosophy and literature, indeed, why any commitment to Enlightenment must consider and confront this partition anew. (shrink)

This paper examines Aquinas's contention that the virtues are necessarily connected, in such a way that anyone who fully possesses one of them, necessarily possesses them all. It is argued that this claim, as Aquinas develops it in the "Summa Theologiae", is more complex, interesting, and plausible than it is often taken to be. On his view, the cardinal virtues can be said to be connected in two senses, corresponding to the two senses in which certain virtues can be (...) said to be cardinal, namely, as general qualifications of all virtuous action and as particular normative ideals having a specific content. This distinction suggests, in turn, that Aquinas's claim that the virtues are connected should be understood as a psychological thesis about what is characteristic of the virtuous person's distinctive way of acting, as well as a thesis about the interrelationships among the different cardinal virtues considered as discrete normative ideals. So understood, Aquinas's claim that the virtues are connected is seen to be a necessary implication of his metaphysically grounded theory of human action. At the same time, it enables him to offer an interpretation of the complexities of moral discourse that is illuminating and at least prima facie plausible, taken on its own merits. (shrink)

On the one hand, freedom is said to be the property of a subject. On the other, freedom only happens in the space of being-in-common. Freedom, then, is the place of a conflict between the “self” and the “with,” between independence or autonomy and dependence or sharing. Resolving this apparent antinomy requires showing how the with ontologically constitutes the self. This, in turn, allows for a rethinking of freedom beyond what liberal democracy and political economy have to offer, as (...) the renewed opening of existence onto nothing, or onto an “outside” that the opening itself constitutes. (shrink)

"Exhalation," a 2008 science fiction short story by Ted Chiang, virtuoso of the genre and the form, begins with a truism, refuted: "It has long been said that air (which others call argon) is the source of life. This is not in fact the case, and I engrave these words to describe how I came to understand the true source of life and, as a corollary, the means by which life will one day end" (37). The narrator's promise is (...) so alluring—knowledge of life's origin, knowledge of its expiration, and knowledge of the relation between the two—that we may be forgiven for overlooking the parenthetical. Argon amounts to less than one percent of the air breathed within Earth's atmosphere. The narrator specifies that "others call... Read More. (shrink)

This article generates an affective hermeneutics of the political. The research question, What is feeling political? is, at first, refined through the oeuvre of political theorist Simone Weil, whose focus on experience, involvement and attention highlights the role of sentience in political life. The inescapable normativity of Weil’s texts calls for an alternative approach to the question at hand, one that acknowledges the inevitability of the phenomenon of feeling political. In order to produce such an approach, the realm in which (...) said phenomenon occurs is spatialized as an indefinite series of rhizomatic affective atmospheres in which the negotiation of one’s involvement, resistance, association, and isolation prompts a variety of orientations. The work of Lauren Berlant is subsequently considered as a means to stress the interplay between noise and ambience on one hand, and the notions of citizenship and community on the other. Ultimately, a reflection inspired by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari emphasizes the humanist undertone of this investigation, reposing the question of feeling political as an ontological query. (shrink)

QUINE'S DOCTRINE of the indeterminacy of translation is made possible by the principle of substitution characteristic of extensional logic. The same characteristic makes it impossible, in philosophy of science, to choose among theoretical models no one of which is obviously best suited to explain the facts. Hilary Putnam achieved a sort of closure to the problem of reference in philosophy of science, when he pointed out the implications of the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem. He said that besides the facts a theory (...) is designed to explain, there are any number of unintended interpretations of the same theory that assign the correct truth values to all sentences of the theory. There can be no sound basis for deciding upon the sole interpretation for a theory. Following Putnam, some philosophers have abandoned the problem of reference in the context of axiomatic systems. Ian Hacking, for instance, prefers a notion of reference "that is not tied by any specific, binding theory about what is referred to." He has turned to the study of approximations and practical models, spurred on by the difficulty of reconciling axiomatic systems to scientific practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn modern societies, religious practice, and belief, is said to be on the decline, especially among the younger generation. However, a strong ecological consciousness is gaining ground. It rests on a conception of good and evil, of sin and expiation, on a history of fall and salvation, regulating practices, beliefs and hopes. To what extent can it be viewed as a form of religion?

Seule la démarche matérialiste en histoire permet de réfuter radicalement les essentialismes, tel que « l’orientalisme » en dépit de la critique infondée de Marx par Edward Said. L’attitude politique de Marx et Engels envers la religion reste d’actualité. Cependant, la tradition marxiste est déficitaire dans le domaine de la sociologie de la religion. Il faut intégrer d’autres apports, dont le concept durkheimien d’anomie, pour comprendre la résurgence du religieux contemporaine du tournant néolibéral. Tandis que le christianisme des origines (...) se prête facilement à une lecture de gauche, la théologie islamique, et notamment sa version ultraorthodoxe propagée par le royaume saoudien, favorise une lecture intégriste combattante. Il est périlleux pour les marxistes de se placer sur le terrain de l’exégèse en islam au lieu de s’en tenir à la séparation entre politique et religion. (shrink)

The proposed text first appeared under the title Prélude. Quand la vérité nous donne rendez-vous as an introduction to Jean Greisch’s volume, Rendez-vous avec la vérité. However, the vortex of metaphors that ‘tell’ the ‘truth’ remains hardly reducible to a single ‘theory’ of ‘Truth’. Over the centuries, what-is-’true’ has been said in many different ways, starting with the unsolvable opposition between the truth-fidelity of the Jewish tradition and the truth-disclosure/manifestation of classical Greek thought; passing through the truth-regulating, namely (...) the truth-institution of Roman Latin culture, which ‘contractualises’ what is true; reaching up to the truths of the medieval Anglo-Saxon world (truth-correspondence, truth-coherence, truth-semantics, truth-consent, truth-interpretation). However, that the truth is not objectified does not mean that it is not an existential issue. On the contrary, this seems to be the lesson one can draw from the encounter between Pilate and Jesus: “I am the Truth”. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe that some of the best pages from the history of philosophy are not those wondering about what the truth is, but rather those pages allowing their own authors and readers to be questioned by the – sometimes sudden – encounter with the disproportion of Truth. Therefore, not theorising but encountering the truth will be a fundamental question of philosophical research. (shrink)

The proposed text first appeared under the title Prélude. Quand la vérité nous donne rendez-vous as an introduction to Jean Greisch's volume, Rendez-vous avec la vérité. However, the vortex of metaphors that 'tell' the 'truth' remains hardly reducible to a single 'theory' of 'Truth'. Over the centuries, what-is-‘true' has been said in many different ways, starting with the unsolvable opposition between the truth-fidelity of the Jewish tradition and the truth-disclosure/manifestation of classical Greek thought; passing through the truth-regulating, namely (...) the truth-institution of Roman Latin culture, which 'contractualises' what is true; reaching up to the truths of the medieval Anglo-Saxon world (truth-correspondence, truth-coherence, truth-semantics, truth-consent, truth-interpretation). However, that the truth is not objectified does not mean that it is not an existential issue. On the contrary, this seems to be the lesson one can draw from the encounter between Pilate and Jesus: "I am the Truth." Nevertheless, it is possible to observe that some of the best pages from the history of philosophy are not those wondering about what the truth is, but rather those pages allowing their own authors and readers to be questioned by the - sometimes sudden - encounter with the disproportion of Truth. Therefore, not theorising but encountering the truth will be a fundamental question of philosophical research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bataille and Sartre: The Modernity of MysticismJean-Michel Heimonet (bio)Translated by Emoretta Yang (bio)1It is always relatively surprising to see how the great minds of an era manifest a kind of blindness when it comes to judging their peers, whether one is thinking of Balzac as the reader of Stendhal or Gide as the reader of Proust. This is undoubtedly because any truly forceful mind is also a mind so (...) obsessed and fascinated by its own way of apprehending the world that it can admit no other system of reference, no other range of values than its own. From this point of view, “A New Mysticism,” the article that Sartre devoted in some bad faith to Bataille’s Inner Experience when the book was published in 1943, should be accorded a prime place in the annals of great literary misunderstandings. There is no doubt that the brilliant philosopher of Being and Nothingness commits a strange blunder—strange, at least, for an intellectual of his stature—with respect to the conceptual sacrifice by which Bataille seeks to reveal and, at the same time, cast out modern man’s nostalgia for the sacred. But is “blunder” the right word? Because everything in the book proceeds not as though Sartre had not understood, or badly understood, but rather as though he had pretended not to understand the true stakes that in turn are revealed and consumed by this impossible book. The harshness of his critiques, the vehemence of tone—poorly tempered by a forced irony—instead prove that Inner Experience had hit home, at a level unusual for intellectual polemics. Struck to the core, Sartre reacted. This explains why “A New Mysticism” is a “boomerang” text, or a revealing one, in the photographic sense, being more valuable for what it tells us about its author than for what it teaches about the object being criticized. It is a text in which the reader has to read what is not said, “between the lines,” seeking the cause for the text’s often flagrantly unjust and indeed petty and truistic assertions, in its defense system, or, to borrow a term from the field of psychoanalysis which Sartre so abhorred, in the author’s “denials.” To put it clearly, is not the presence of the sacred, this unknowable and virulent sacred, which seeps out of every part of Bataille’s book, through the cracks and tears in its “form” and the paradoxical gaps in its “content,” also the presence that ceaselessly haunts, with its shadow and disturbing light, the thinking of the last great philosopher-monster?In his didactic concern to be convincing, Sartre divided his article into three parts, the first two dealing respectively with “form” and “content,” the third functioning as a verdict. Viewed fifty years later, such a division applied to a text as anti-academic as Inner Experience might seem comical. It points, however, to the seriousness being accorded in Sartre’s text to knowledge as organized within the academy and to the institutional function of the academy. From one end of the text to the other, Sartre acts as censor and judge, pitilessly pointing out, with the derisive scorn of the specialist, the philosophical naiveté of “Mr. Bataille,” particularly his rapid and unprofessional reading of Jaspers and Heidegger, which Bataille knew only in translation [see “NM” 194]. Sartre’s superior mandarin attitude explains why his first task had been to divide literary and philosophical history into two “frames of mind.” Although original, Bataille’s style and writing already had their place in a “tradition,” which is that line from Pascal to the surrealists, by way of Nietzsche, made up of writers anxious to express (themselves), writing down their [End Page 59] thoughts as they come, helter-skelter, in the exalted illumination of the moment, even before being located and fixed within the design of an argument. In modern writers, this tradition had become even more intensified. Disregarding the classical writerly values of restraint and modesty, the writer seeks to express not only his mind but also his body and its living reality, to establish with the reader a sort of “carnal promiscuity.” Thus we get Breton, who... (shrink)

"My plan in this book," writes Father Danielou, the eminent French theologian, "is not to record what I say of God, but what God has said of Himselfà to place religions and philosophies, the Old Testament and the New, theology and mysticism, in their proper relationship with the knowledge of God." God and the Ways of Knowing is a classic work of theology and spirituality that presents a subtle and penetrating interpretation of the ways by which man comes to (...) the knowledge of Godùeach form of knowledge carrying him both higher and deeper. (shrink)

QUINE'S DOCTRINE of the indeterminacy of translation is made possible by the principle of substitution characteristic of extensional logic. The same characteristic makes it impossible, in philosophy of science, to choose among theoretical models no one of which is obviously best suited to explain the facts. Hilary Putnam achieved a sort of closure to the problem of reference in philosophy of science, when he pointed out the implications of the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem. He said that besides the facts a theory (...) is designed to explain, there are any number of unintended interpretations of the same theory that assign the correct truth values to all sentences of the theory. There can be no sound basis for deciding upon the sole interpretation for a theory. Following Putnam, some philosophers have abandoned the problem of reference in the context of axiomatic systems. Ian Hacking, for instance, prefers a notion of reference "that is not tied by any specific, binding theory about what is referred to." He has turned to the study of approximations and practical models, spurred on by the difficulty of reconciling axiomatic systems to scientific practice. (shrink)

When rape by an armed organization occurs frequently, it is often said to be a strategy of war. But some cases of conflict-related rape are better understood as a practice, violence that has not been explicitly adopted as organization policy but is nonetheless tolerated by commanders. The typology of conflict-related rape in this article emphasizes not only vertical relationships between commanders and combatants but also the horizontal social interactions among combatants. It analyzes when rape is likely to be prevalent (...) as a practice, emphasizing not only gendered norms and beliefs of the society from which combatants come but also how those might be transformed by the organization’s socialization processes. In the conclusion, I suggest that the typology is relevant for analysts of all forms of of political violence and also for prosecutors, policy advocates, and policymakers concerned with conflict-related rape. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700Jean-Pascal AnfrayRussell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielsen, editors. The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003. Pp. vi + 346. Cloth, $149.00.This volume contains contributions that aim to show the continuity between late medieval thought and early modern philosophy, or, as the editors say, to investigate "the way that medieval thought (...) served as a fertile basis for developments in the early modern period" (3). As the title indicates, most papers treat topics more or less connected to modalities, either from a logical or from an ontological point of view. The nature of modalities is indeed at the core of metaphysics and philosophical theology. Ludger Honnefelder, Joël Biard, and Fabrizio Mondori all show the influence of Duns Scotus on the setting of modern metaphysics. The importance of theological matters in the development of philosophical thought has been acknowledged for a long time. Thus Chris Schabel ("Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: Auriol, Pomponazzi, and Luther on 'Scholastic Subtleties'") sketches the story of the controversy over God's foreknowledge and future contingents from its setting in the early fourteenth century to Lutheran Reformation. He stresses the underestimated influence of Peter Auriol in this continuing debate. Still, revealed theology too exercised influence on the philosophy of logic. Trinity constitutes an until now little studied case, which is the subject matter of Simo Knuuttila's contribution ("The Question of the Validity of Logic in Late Medieval Thought"). He partly rehearses some of his well-known theses about the source of logical truths and modalities and analyses the constructivist aspects of Descartes's position, in so far as the laws of logic are said to depend on God's will. But the most original part of the study bears on the effects of Trinitarian constraints within the field of logic, especially in syllogistics. Medieval thinkers had to cope with syllogisms like: "The divine essence is the father; the divine essence is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father." In order to avoid the absurdity of the conclusion, many answers were elaborated: Robert Holcot removed the Trinity from the domain of validity of syllogistics, thereby relativizing it. Luther's claim that the principles of theology contradict those of logic looks like a radical version of this position. Adam Wodeham maintained contrariwise the universality of syllogistics: he held that the premisses are not syllogistic if they are interpreted as true (130). His account is based on the identity theory of predication and on the distinction between intensional and extensional identity, which both date back to Abelard.In the period covered by the volume, early modern scholastic, chiefly the Jesuit scholastic, holds a central place. Two articles insist on its originality and intrinsic value. Jeffrey Coombs ("The Ontological Source of Logical Possibility in Catholic Second Scholasticism") [End Page 208] analyzes the various metaphysics of modalities. He claims that three theories of the source of logical modalities were entertained during the early seventeenth century, which he labels respectively "transcendentalism," "modal voluntarism," and "divine conceptualism." All of these positions can be traced back to medieval theories; however, they received an extensive treatment in late scholastic thought. Coombs is especially illuminating when he emphasizes the importance of the grounding metaphysical structure: essences and their systematic relations through "Porphyrian trees." This generated two different accounts of the ontological status of essences: according to essentialist theories, complete Porphyrian trees are the basis of necessity and possibility, while according to a "string theories," only the logical connections between the components of the essential structure are available eternally (196).Yet the most striking novelty of the time lies in the systematization of a statistical interpretation of modalities through the "moral modalities," originating in post-Tridentine Catholic theology. In contrast to Hacking's thesis (see The Taming of Chance [Cambridge, 1990]), Sven Knebel ("The Renaissance of Statistical Modalities in Early Modern Scholasticism") contends that the concept of aleatory probability was first developed within this context. That an event-type Q is morally necessary means that Q is always the case, and that not-Q actually is never the case (236... (shrink)

Assigning the moniker stakeholder to the planet has stirred a rather interesting debate in recent years. Proponents have insisted that the Earth is both the ultimate source of economic resources and the ultimate sink for economic wastes, meaning that it “affects or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). They have said that giving the Earth stakeholder status can effectively tie the ecological health of the planet to the economic survival of the firm, (...) and they have demonstrated this by focusing primarily on the economic benefits which can accrue to firms that effectively respond to the ecological concerns of regulators, consumers, investors, lenders, insurers, and so forth. However, others have questioned assigning the Earth stakeholder status. They have said that doing so convolutes the definition of stakeholder too much by expanding it to something other than “person[s] and groups” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46), and they have said that referring to the planet as a stakeholder is an idealistic view which defies the realities of the relationship between economic activity and the Entropy Law. Regardless of the side, the arguments in this debate have focused primarily at the economic level. Does the Earth’s central place in humanity’s economic survival suffice to give it stakeholder status? Does the Earth have voices on boards of directors? Is the underlying assumption made by those who advocate giving the Earth stakeholder status—that economic activity is ecologically sustainable—truly reflective of the relationship between economics and entropy? However, for us this debate took an interesting turn away from the economic level at the 1997 Ruffin Lectures in Business Ethics when Ian Mitroff said, “The Earth is a stakeholder, but it is a spiritual stakeholder.”. (shrink)

Assigning the moniker stakeholder to the planet has stirred a rather interesting debate in recent years. Proponents have insisted that the Earth is both the ultimate source of economic resources and the ultimate sink for economic wastes, meaning that it “affects or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). They have said that giving the Earth stakeholder status can effectively tie the ecological health of the planet to the economic survival of the firm, (...) and they have demonstrated this by focusing primarily on the economic benefits which can accrue to firms that effectively respond to the ecological concerns of regulators, consumers, investors, lenders, insurers, and so forth. However, others have questioned assigning the Earth stakeholder status. They have said that doing so convolutes the definition of stakeholder too much by expanding it to something other than “person[s] and groups” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46), and they have said that referring to the planet as a stakeholder is an idealistic view which defies the realities of the relationship between economic activity and the Entropy Law. Regardless of the side, the arguments in this debate have focused primarily at the economic level. Does the Earth’s central place in humanity’s economic survival suffice to give it stakeholder status? Does the Earth have voices on boards of directors? Is the underlying assumption made by those who advocate giving the Earth stakeholder status—that economic activity is ecologically sustainable—truly reflective of the relationship between economics and entropy? However, for us this debate took an interesting turn away from the economic level at the 1997 Ruffin Lectures in Business Ethics when Ian Mitroff said, “The Earth is a stakeholder, but it is a spiritual stakeholder.”. (shrink)

Diversity is an undeniable fact of nature, and there is now evidence that nature did not stop generating diversity just before “designing” the human brain :15,468–15,473. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1509654112, 2015). If neurodiversity is a fact of nature, what about neurodivergence? Although the terms “neurodiversity” and “neurodivergence” are sometimes used interchangeably, this is, we believe, a mistake: “neurodiversity” is a term of inclusion whereas “neurodivergence” is a term of exclusion. To make the difference clear, note that everyone can be said to be (...) neurodiverse, but that it is almost impossible for everyone to be neurodivergent. Neurodivergence is, we claim here, a fact of society. Neurodivergent individuals are those whose cognitive profile diverges from an established cognitive norm, a norm that is not an objective statistical fact of human neurological functioning but a standard established and maintained by socio-political processes. In this paper, we describe the socio-political mechanisms that build neurodivergence out of neurodiversity which, inspired by Mihai :395–416. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-017-0186-z, 2018), we call “epistemic and cognitive marginalization”. First, we extend the traditional concept of neurodiversity, which we believe too closely tied to a neuroreductionist conception of cognition, to that of “extended neurodiversity,” thereby viewing neurodiversity through the lens of 4E cognition. Considering that human cognition depends on epistemic resources, both for their construction and their online dynamic expression, we hypothesize that the differential access to epistemic resources in society, a form of epistemic injustice, is an overlooked mechanism that turns neurodiversity into neurodivergence. In doing so, we shed light on a type of epistemic injustice that might be missing from the epistemic injustice literature: cognitive injustices. (shrink)